As this essay is in part intended to acquaint readers with
the Attic Nights, I include several fairly long passages from it. Quotations from Gellius are from the
translation of J. C. Rolfe in the Loeb Library edition of Attic Nights (1927),
which the reader may conveniently consult online at https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/e/roman/texts/gellius/home.html.
Surely the most
critical adaptation of our species is our facility at manipulating
symbols. The evolution then of language
enabled surely the more effective pursuit of prey but all subsequent thought,
science, and culture as well. Just as we
perceive that cats relish stalking and imagine that orb-weaving spiders must
take pleasure in a fine web, people enjoy practicing their most highly
developed skill, sometimes simply as recreation in such verbal forms as jokes,
songs, stories, and flights of conversation.
Since the Palaeolithic era people’s verbal play has constituted their
primary form of entertainment.
A taste for such
semiotic dancing in both composer and consumer is the initial motive for all literature. In certain written works, however, the human
fondness for symbolic play is more highlighted, more naked, more joyously
enthusiastic. In journals, notebooks, and
commonplace books, the jottings and sketchings of the mind may rarely rise to
the level of the sublime, but they directly indicate our human pleasure in
symbolic play, creating, carving, juggling, forming ever-new patterns in the
immense catalogue of possibilities generated by grammar. Among the greatest of such works are surely The
Pillow Book of Sei Shōnagon, Athenaeus’ Deipnosophists, and the Noctes
Atticae (Attic Nights) of Aulus Gellius.
I have lately
been reading in Aulus Gellius. It is not
a volume to read through one page after another, beginning to end. I am opening the Loeb Library volumes at
random and reading ten or twelve pages at a stretch. The work invites that sort of approach. It is a miscellany, an omnium gatherum,
a rag-bag, and the author readily admits that the book lacks structure; its
construction follows no discernable order but the wanderings of a human mind,
all digressions and no central path. The
very title seems to hint at something torrid and tropical, warm zephyrs playing
over a bare torso under loose robes, a cool glass of retsina at hand, and the
book does indeed pursue a sort of hedonism.
For the author, though, some of the greatest pleasures are intellectual,
undiminished in intensity by the fact that the fox his mind was hunting may bd
either grand, such as the question of whether the phenomenal world be real, or
minute, such as an obscure linguistic detail or an odd shred of natural
history. The primary association of the
title for a Roman would have been its invocation of the revered Greek
rhetorical and poetic traditions, inviting the reader for a bit of play in the
realm of the recondite.
The book is a
collection of short comments and narrations, a paragraph or two or three on
every sort of topic, but frequently concerning language or history. As a result of this form Gellius is less
often read for his style or for the impact of the book as a whole than remembered
for the many fragments of lost writings he preserves which scholars may mine
for historic and linguistic details. Considered
in itself the Attic Nights is a charming example of cognition as
recreation, intellectual riffing as play.
The book’s unstructured form, its interest in oddities and details
invites the reader to turn a curious imaginative gaze as the author points out
the dramatic trees, pretty scenes, and unlikely hillocks of a great variety of scenes,
whether encountered in lived experience or in books. Gellius’ aesthetic intention is unmistakable. He explicitly defines his aim as to be
“entertaining,” that “recreation might be provided for my children, when they should
have some respite from business affairs and could unbend and divert their
minds.” He describes his method as “haphazard,”
“without order or arrangement,” “off-hand, without premeditation” (Praefatio).
Such randomness is appropriate since the
free process of ratiocination and the play of imagination are the goal more
than any apodictic conclusion.
Gellius displays
his rhetorical sophistication even as he disclaims it, deploying the humility
topos as he claims to write “almost in rustic fashion.” While “bearing in mind my limitations,” he
says he falls as far “short of all other writers in the dignity too even of my
title, as I do in care and in elegance of style.” Yet he goes on to define an ambitious goal,
promising his book might be “a kind of foretaste of the liberal arts,” offering
“the germs and the quality to make men's minds grow more vigorous, their memory
more trustworthy, their eloquence more effective, their diction purer, or the
pleasures of their hours of leisure and recreation more refined.” For Gellius verbal facility is a source of
pleasure as well as the chief means of cultivating the mind and, most
importantly, the fountainhead of all intellectual work.
He goes so far as
to warn off potential readers who do not delight in language, those “who have
never found pleasure nor busied themselves in reading, inquiring, writing and
taking notes, who have never spent wakeful nights in such employments, who have
never improved themselves by discussion and debate with rival followers of the
same Muse.” Such people prefer to waste
their time, he suggests, “in the turmoil of business affairs.” Without criticizing earning a living, Gellius
suggests that people do not become fully human until their time is their own.
A passage in Attic
Nights (III, 1) provides a nearly cinematic enactment of what he is talking
about.
When winter was already waning, we were walking with the philosopher
Favorinus in the court of the Titian baths, enjoying the mild warmth of the
sun; and there, as we walked, Sallust's Catiline was being read, a book
which Favorinus had seen in the hands of a friend and had asked him to
read. The following passage from that
book had been recited: "Avarice implies a desire for money, which no wise
man covets; steeped as it were with noxious poisons, it renders the most manly
body and soul effeminate; it is ever unbounded, nor can either plenty or want
make it less." Then Favorinus
looked at me and said: "How does avarice make a man's body effeminate? For
I seem to grasp in general the meaning of his statement that it has that effect
on a manly soul, but how also it makes his body effeminate I do not yet
comprehend." "I too,"
said I, "have for a long time been putting myself that question, and if
you had not anticipated me, I should of my own accord have asked you to answer
it."
Scarcely had I said this with some hesitation, when one of the disciples
of Favorinus, who seemed to be an old hand in the study
of literature, broke in: "I once heard Valerius Probus say that
Sallust here used a kind of poetic circumlocution, and meaning to say that a
man was corrupted by avarice, spoke of his body and soul, the two factors which
indicate a man; for man is made up of body and soul." "Never," replied Favorinus,
"at least, so far as I know, was our Probus guilty of such impertinent and
bold subtlety as to say that Sallust, a most skilful artist in conciseness,
used poetic paraphrases."
There was with us at the time in the same promenade a man of
considerable learning. He too, on being
asked by Favorinus whether he had anything to say on the subject, answered to
this effect: "We observe that almost all those whose minds are possessed
and corrupted by avarice and who have devoted themselves to the acquisition of
money from any and every source, so regulate their lives, that compared with
money they neglect manly toil and attention to bodily exercise, as they do
everything else. For they are commonly
intent upon indoor and sedentary pursuits, in which all their vigoor of mind
and body is enfeebled and, as Sallust says, ‘rendered effeminate.'”
Then Favorinus again asked to have the same words of Sallust read again,
and when they had been read, he said: "How then are we to explain the
fact, that it is possible to find many men who are greedy for money, but
nevertheless have strong and active bodies?" To this the man replied thus: "Your answer is certainly to the point. Whoever," said he, "is greedy for
money, but nevertheless has a body that is strong and in good condition, must
necessarily be possessed either by an interest in, or devotion to, other things
as well, and cannot be equally niggardly in his care of himself. For if extreme avarice, to the exclusion of
everything else, lay hold upon all a man's actions and desires, and if it
extend even to neglect of his body, so that because of that one passion he has
regard neither for virtue nor physical strength, nor body, nor soul — then, and
then only, can that vice truly be said to cause effeminacy both of body and
soul, since such men care neither for themselves nor for anything else except
money." Then said Favorinus:
"Either what you have said is reasonable, or Sallust, through hatred of
avarice, brought against it a heavier charge than he could justify."
As the anecdote
opens, a group of friends appears at leisure, enjoying a stroll as the last
days of winter give way to early spring “in the court of the Titian baths,
enjoying the mild warmth of the sun.”
Among the party is the philosopher Favorinus, an Academic Skeptic and
Gellius’ teacher. One of the party carries
a copy of Sallust's Conspiracy of Catiline and reads aloud as they
walk. The modern reader is struck by the
depiction of a culture in which a promenade might be accompanied by reading aloud,
and abstract questions are discussed for the sheer joy of debate more than in
the interest of problem solving or academic rivalry. Thinkers naturally lead the group, here the
center is Favorinus, advocate of a strict skepticism and, incidentally,
described as a born eunuch, yet celebrated for his philosophic powers. Favorinus became sufficiently controversial not
because of his ambiguous sexuality but due to Hadrian’s arbitrary disfavor that
Corinth tore down the statue the city had erected in his honor, causing him to
remark drily that it was a pity that had Socrates had such statue to serve as
his proxy, he might have been saved from execution.
Here, however, Favorinus
is simply moderator of a discussion to which all present are welcome to
contribute. The coterie is preselected; one
participant is identified as “a man of considerable learning” and another as “an
old hand in the study of literature,” giving their remarks depth and weight,
and instructing the less experienced by their tone and manner more than by
their opinions. A modern American reader
is likely to be struck by the issue they consider: whether avarice saps one’s
strength, rendering a person effeminate.
This idea recalls the preface’s contemptuous dismissal of those who
devote themselves to “business affairs,” a refreshing attitude to those of us
who inhabit a culture in which making money is considered the hallmark of manly
vigor.
For this party of
leisured ancient Romans, though, the question in the end is left open. Sallust may or may not be correct or he may
be correct in part; he may have expressed himself accurately or perhaps in a
misleading, “over-artful” fashion. There
is no certainty, only inquiry, the Greek meaning, in fact, of the word
skepticism. These Romans revel in practicing
cognition, in juggling ideas, and in the social contact with other thinking
beings capable of the same amusement, Plato’s clique freed from great ideas and
allowed the smallest of small talk for the simple fun of it, just passing the
time on a warming afternoon.
Though Gellius’
entries are more often presented as third-hand accounts of opinions than in
dialogue dramas like this, in each the author carries on a colloquy with
acquaintances, writers of the past, and inevitably with the presumed
reader. Gellius interests himself, it
seems, equally in every topic. He
discusses the smallest details of language and usage or of history with the
same absorbed interest that he accords major issues of epistemology. Always animated by the spirit of
disinterested inquiry, pure self-justifying research, ludic thought, the weight
of each section of text is equal to any other.
A review of a few passages, chosen as randomly as my desultory reading
of Attic Nights, illustrates the author’s sensibility.
This
Favorinus who asked that Sallust be read aloud was an Academic Skeptic in the
tradition of Arcesilaus. At one point in
the Attic Nights Gellius defines their position.
Those whom we call the Pyrronian
philosophers are designated by the Greek name σκεπτικοί, or
"sceptics," which means about the same as "inquirers" and
"investigators." For they
decide nothing and determine nothing, but are always engaged in inquiring and
considering what there is in all nature concerning which it is possible to
decide and determine. And moreover they
believe that they do not see or hear anything clearly, but that they undergo
and experience something like seeing and hearing; but they are in doubt as of
that nature and character of those very things which cause them those
experiences, and they deliberate about them; and they declare that in
everything assurance and absolute truth seem so beyond our grasp, owing to the
mingling and confusing of the indications of truth and falsehood, that any man
who is not rash and precipitate in his judgment ought to use the language which
they say was used by Pyrro, the founder of that philosophy: "Does not this
matter stand so, rather than so, or is it neither?" For they deny that
proofs of anything and its real qualities can be known and understood, and they
try in many ways to point this out and demonstrate it. On this subject Favorinus too with great
keenness and subtlety has composed ten books, which he entitled Πυρρωνεῖοι
Τρόποι, or The Pyrronian Principles. (XI, 5)
The following
section of this entry goes on to emphasize the absolute skepticism of the
Pyrrhonians who in contrast to the Academic Skeptics question even the
certainty of uncertainty. The schools
are so similar that he says they are often confused. Both base their inquiries into the meaning of
appearances (φαντασίαι) which both Pyrrhonians and Academics regard as reflecting
not “the nature of the objects themselves,” but rather “the condition of mind
or body of those to whom these appearances come.” These data are unreliable since they consider
“all things that affect men's sense” to be “τὰ πρός τι,” that is, "things
relative to something else," a notion resembling the Buddhist “pratītyasamutpāda,”
or dependent origination. For this
reason everything possesses only a qualified and ambiguous reality.
Accepting that
nothing can be finally verified might seem to disable research before it
begins, but the skeptic is an inquirer.
The denial of a dogmatic conclusion need not halt the process of seeking
truth. The assumption of the tight web
of causality apparently linking every element in what seems the phenomenal
world endows every bit of information with a gleam as numinous as the next
bit. A sensibility like that reflected
in this book will look with interest on any information at all, but, as a homo
sapiens, with a particular fancy for the play of signification in language. The meaning may hold secondary importance of
none at all. Gellius can manipulate
abstractions based on observation like a painter imagining the design of a
picture while observing decorative fountains.
He elevates what might be an idle fondness for trivia into a philosophic
enterprise by celebrating the pure play of thought. Though Gellius exhibits no piety as such, his
relish for every detail illuminates his inquiry like an interior lit by stained
glass windows; his book is a lengthy series of tiny side chapels in the cranium.
Modern readers
who are not specialists in historical philology may have little sympathy for
the appeal of a topic like the question of “Whether affatim, like admodum,
should be pronounced with an acute accent on the first syllable; with some
painstaking observations on the accents of other words.” (VI, 7) In Gellius’ circles, however, such minutiae
engaged many. He records, for instance,
that when he wrote a friend, noting that he had written twice before, making
this the third time (tertium), his correspondent raises an issue of
usage, asking why he had written tertium and not tertio and going
on to inquire whether “one should say tertium consul, meaning
"consul for the third time," and quartum, or tertio and
quarto.” (X, 1) Is the author a
tiresome pedant or a crusader for precise language? I suggest he is neither as much as he is
simply a denizen of a semiotic realm, enjoying his environment, swimming in an
ocean of words as the shark glides through the sea, in his case by making
conversation with a friend. The topic of
their talk is of little moment.
Even the most sympathetic
reader would concede that a good deal of Gellius’ book consists of matter that
looks rather like abstruse nit-picking.
At times the Attic Nights seems a monument of pedantic minutiae
like those grand tomes of Chandler on accents or Denniston on Greek particles
with the difference that Gellius’ work has less practical use. While those works were composed to aid the
reader of Classical texts, only by unlikely coincidence might a topic Gellius
addresses be useful in reading a text or solving a problem. The only excuse for reading Gellius is to
pass the time pleasantly, but any human end higher than this must rest on shaky
ground.
Gellius’
imagination possesses not only a microscope to examine with detail and
precision the niceties of language; he had as well a telescope capable of a
focus far beyond the horizon. His grand
topics enter through the same intimate social context he uses for what seem
more trivial issues. His approach to
basic issues of semiotics and epistemology goes far to account for his
sensibility and the character of the book that preserves, as though in amber,
indications of his consciousness.
Chrysippus asserts that every word is by nature ambiguous, since two or
more things may be understood from the same word. But Diodorus, surnamed
Cronus, says: "No word is ambiguous, and no one speaks or receives a word
in two senses; and it ought not to seem to be said in any other sense than that
which the speaker feels that he is giving it. But when I," said he,
"meant one thing and you have understood another, it may seem that I have
spoken obscurely rather than ambiguously; for the nature of an ambiguous word
should be such that he who speaks it expresses two or more meanings. But no man
expresses two meanings who has felt that he is expressing but one." (XI, 12)
The Stoic
Chrysippus, (who may have been acting the provocateur) argues that all
utterance is ambiguous and indeterminate in meaning. He here approaches the position of Gorgias
and, a few generations later, Pyrrho that communication is impossible. His interlocutor objects that every speaker has
a meaning in mind which must then be considered the single correct
meaning. Such meaning is unchanged even
if one’s audience misunderstands. As
always, Gellius simply presents both sides of a question (just as Diogenes
Laertius [VII, 7, 183] says that Chrysippus would do), and Diodorus’ confidence
is unpersuasive since intentions may be far from clear even to the individual,
and language that may sometimes convey signification accurately is little
better than language that always fails.
For Gellius there is always more to talk about tomorrow.
His anecdote of
the Greek Cynic Peregrinus Proteus introduces a character more intriguing
perhaps than his teaching.
When I was at Athens, I met a philosopher named Peregrinus, who was
later surnamed Proteus, a man of dignity and fortitude, living in a hut outside
the city. And visiting him frequently, I heard him say many things that were in
truth helpful and noble. Among these I particularly recall the following:
He used to say that a wise man would not commit a sin, even if he knew
that neither gods nor men would know it; for he thought that one ought to
refrain from sin, not through fear of punishment or disgrace, but from love of
justice and honesty and from a sense of duty.
If, however, there were any who were neither so endowed by nature nor so
well disciplined that they could easily keep themselves from sinning by their
own will power, he thought that such men would all be more inclined to sin
whenever they thought that their guilt could be concealed and when they had
hope of impunity because of such concealment.
"But," said he, "if men know that nothing at all can be
hidden for very long, they will sin more reluctantly and more
secretly." Therefore he said that
one should have on his lips these verses of Sophocles, the wisest of poets:
See to it lest you
try aught to conceal;
Time sees and hears all, and will
all reveal.
Another one of the old poets, whose name
has escaped my memory at present, called Truth the daughter of Time.
In the opening of
the story, the reader glimpses once more the social context for Gellius’
sensibility. He and others knew
Peregrinus personally, a man not only with opinions, but with a distinct
lifestyle as well, living in a “hut” outside of town in imitation of Diogenes
to indicate his contempt for worldly values.
Peregrinus had, like Augustine, passed through phases in his
spirituality, having for some years practiced Christianity in Palestine. In the end he announced his intention to
commit suicide go demonstrate his indifference to death and carried out this
intention during the Olympics when crowds might appreciate his gesture. Lucian who witnessed the event described his
motive.
He said that he wanted to put a tip
of gold on a golden life; for one who had lived as Heracles should die like
Heracles and be commingled with the aether. And I wish, said he, to benefit
mankind by showing them the way in which one should disregard death.
(De Morte Peregrini, 33)
In Gellius’ story, the philosopher himself cites a line from
a tragedian as support for his ideas and this line reminds Gellius of another
passage which he cites, though unsure of its author. The fact that the source of his phrase has
slipped his mind only emphasizes the casual quotidian character of his
inquiries. They are like his breathing a
matter of daily experience.
Many of Gellius’
anecdotes reflect the social world of his day, in which it seems everyone
(among the elite) was a verbal artist and everyone a philosopher. One story relates how a student risked death
in order to hear Socrates speak, in contrast to the dissipated youth of the
present generation.
The philosopher Taurus, a
celebrated Platonist of my time, used to urge the study of philosophy by many
other good and wholesome examples and in particular stimulated the minds of the
young by what he said that Euclides the Socratic used to do. "The Athenians," said he, "had
provided in one of their decrees that any citizen of Megara who should be found
to have set foot in Athens should for that suffer death; so great," says
he, "was the hatred of the neighbouring men of Megara with which the
Athenians were inflamed. Then Euclides,
who was from that very town of Megara and before the passage of that decree had
been accustomed to come to Athens and to listen to Socrates, after the
enactment of that measure, at nightfall, as darkness was coming on, clad in a
woman's long tunic, wrapped in a parti-coloured mantle, and with veiled head,
used to walk from his home in Megara to Athens, to visit Socrates, in order
that he might at least for some part of the night share in the master's
teaching and discourse. And just before dawn he went back again, a distance of
somewhat over twenty miles, disguised in that same garb. But nowadays," said Taurus, "we may
see the philosophers themselves running to the doors of rich young men, to give
them instruction, and there they sit and wait until nearly noonday, for their
pupils to sleep off all last night's wine." (VII 10)
Taurus had been, in fact, Gellius’ own teacher, so this note
likely records an actual lecture. Euclides
of Megara went on to write dialogues and commentaries himself (though very
little remains) maintaining a monistic view still based on his master’s
teachings, a kind of revival of Parmenides’ non-dualistic thought. According to Diogenes Laertius (II, 6, 106)
“he held the supreme good to be really one, though called by many names,
sometimes wisdom, sometimes God, and again Mind, and so forth. But all that is
contradictory of the good he used to reject, declaring that it had no
existence.” Apart from this simple yet
radical view Euclides was receptive to rhetoric and eristics, attracting
criticism from Socrates himself who preferred the pose of a disinterested
pursuit of truth.
Gellius would
have stood with Euclides in his extravagant use of regardless of truth-claims. Specific teachings are hardly an issue in Attic
Nights. Whatever the theme or the
conclusion, what is important here is the process, the social dialectics,
people tossing ideas about in public and at dinner parties, recreational discussion,
playful inquiry, and artful use of words, people acting people-like.
The taste for
linguistic discernment and verbal play evident in Gellius animates as well the world
of Petronius’ Satyricon, for instance, which antedated Attic Nights
by about a hundred years. The characters
depicted by the arbiter elegantiae play with words as often as they play
with each other’s bodies. They debate
the merits of teachers of rhetoric, spout poetry to make a point, play word
games, refer to Homer, and discuss issues of no immediate relevance. Today, a not dissimilar taste is evident in
contemporary bumper stickers, graffiti, advertising slogans, and internet memes
as well as in popular music and drama. The
character of some of the earliest human burials indicates that this taste for
the symbolic has existed since prehistoric times.
Wherever the
reader opens the Attic Nights, there is Gellius exercising his
gratuitous ingenuity, a kind of joyously superfluous symbolic manipulation,
semiotic fooling for its own sake, toward no end whatever but the celebration
of our oh-so-human minds. And the reader
may perform the part of silent dance partner, relishing the grace notes, the
subtleties, the fine texture of another’s consciousness as though it were an
abstract pattern. Here is the very
fountainhead of art, science, and philosophy.
Arguments about the origin of language may be always unresolved, but perhaps
our species began communicating simply because it was so much fun. If the hunters bagged more game that way,
they also afforded themselves greater leisure to talk away the long evenings of
their days. And Gellius was doing much
the same in antiquity as I do now, reading Gellius on my computer screen as he
read from manuscripts, and you the
reader have joined as well, an equal partner in the endless conversation.